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1 Introduction
For the poor whose lives are highly exposed to uncertainties, the way they deal with
these uncertainties can affect their well-being substantially. Literature on the relation-
ship between risk aversion and the poverty trap (Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009; Spears
2013) suggests that the poor being more risk averse may further trap them in poverty,
as they will be less willing to invest in new technologies. “Thus they will remain poor,
with processes of capital investment and innovation being confined to those people
who are economically secure and in possession of sufficient defence against risk to
be willing to invest and innovate” (Weeks 1970).
In reality, uncertainty goes beyond risk, and people’s attitudes towards uncer-
tainty cannot be captured by risk aversion alone. In everyday life, we mostly face
situations with no well-defined probabilities — ambiguity. Research on decision
under ambiguity has shown that people are ambiguity averse, preferring risky bets to
ambiguous ones (Ellsberg 1961; Halevy 2007; Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015).
And ambiguity aversion has predictive power for real life decisions (Ross et al. 2012;
Engle-Warnick et al. 2011; Sutter et al. 2013; Bianchi and Tallon 2014; Dimmock
et al. 2016a, b). However, the literature on the relationship between risk aversion
and income1 is much richer than the literature on the relationship between ambiguity
aversion and income (Akay et al. 2012; Butler et al. 2014; Dimmock et al. 2016b).
The main reason for this gap in the literature is that until recently no tools were
available to measure ambiguity attitudes in natural circumstances.
This paper is the first to study the relationship between people’s ambiguity atti-
tudes and income in the field using a natural source of ambiguity — language. One
challenge for field studies with non-academic subjects is that the commonly used
experimental tasks are difficult for these subjects to understand. Low comprehension
levels introduce noise and therefore reduce both the internal and external validity of
experimental measures. The comprehension problem is especially severe for ambi-
guity measurements as they often involve abstract and artificial decision problems.
A methodological contribution of this paper to ambiguity theory is that it shows how
the new measurement method of Baillon et al. (2017b) can be adapted and applied in
field studies. Baillon et al. (2017b) were the first to measure ambiguity attitudes for
natural events, but they did so in the lab with sophisticated academic subjects. This
paper adapts their measurement to a decision context involving uncertainties concern-
ing unknown meanings of foreign phrases. This is a familiar decision context for the
subjects in this study, Chinese high school adolescents, who encounter similar exer-
cises in foreign language courses. We show that our ambiguity attitude measurements
have validity in the field and can provide insights into policy applications.
Besides the benefit of enhancing subjects’ comprehension of experimental tasks,
studying people’s attitudes towards natural ambiguity is desirable in itself as empha-
sized by Ellsberg (1961, 2011). Studies exploring the richness of natural ambiguity
sources have shown that people’s attitudes vary across different sources (Heath and
1See for instance Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992), Ogaki and Zhang (2001), Cohen and Einav (2007),
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009), and the review in Meyer and Meyer (2005).
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Tversky 1991; Abdellaoui et al. 2011). Several sources of uncertainty, such as tem-
perature and stock market returns, have been studied (Heath and Tversky 1991;
Abdellaoui et al. 2011; Chew et al. 2012; Baillon et al. 2017b). This paper stud-
ies ambiguity generated by language. Signals in social interactions are often sent
using ambiguous language. Important decisions, such as whether to enter a business
contract or whether to pursue a romantic relationship, are made without all linguis-
tic ambiguities resolved (Grant et al. 2014, 2016). In natural language, linguistic
ambiguity refers to linguistic vagueness that is open to different interpretations. In
decision theory, ambiguity refers to unknown probabilities. Linguistic ambiguity can
be treated as a special case of decision-theoretic ambiguity, as demonstrated by Grant
et al. (2014, 2016), Shattuck and Wagner (2016), and our experiment.
The big income variation of the current sample allows for better detection of the
relationship between people’s ambiguity attitudes and income. Two groups of Chi-
nese adolescents (rural and urban) are recruited. The rural subjects are mostly from
farming households in a small county who all receive financial aid from a non-
governmental organization.2 The urban subjects are high school students mostly from
middle class households in a big city. The richest households are 70 (80) times richer
than the poorest in the rural (urban) group. Also, the rural adolescents are on aver-
age 10 times poorer than their urban counterparts. These big income variations make
it possible to study the impact of income on ambiguity attitudes both within and
between these two groups.
Within the rural group, ambiguity aversion decreases as income increases, whereas
no effect is found for the urban adolescents. Previous studies in the developing world
found no relationship between wealth and ambiguity aversion (Engle-Warnick et al.
2011; Akay et al. 2012; Cardenas and Carpenter 2013). These studies included prox-
ies for wealth as control variables where the main research questions concerned the
relationship between people’s ambiguity attitudes and some real life decisions such
as adoption of new technologies. Due to the different objectives of those studies, the
wealth variations in their sample may not have been large enough to detect the impact
of wealth on ambiguity aversion. The current study is the first to find a significant
effect of income on ambiguity aversion. It shows that the poorest were also the most
averse to ambiguity, which may further trap them in poverty. The lack of a significant
impact of income on ambiguity aversion among the urban adolescents, whose house-
hold income is closer to people in the developed world, is consistent with the findings
in a representative sample of the Dutch population by Dimmock et al. (2016b).
Regarding between-group comparisons, urban adolescents are less ambiguity
averse than their rural counterparts. Some preceding studies made between-group
comparisons. For instance, Akay et al. (2012) compared ambiguity aversion between
Ethiopian farmers and Dutch university students and found no difference. The
between-group comparison in his paper shares the problem with other preceding
studies that causes of the findings are difficult to identify due to unobserved con-
founds. While I acknowledge that the current study could not exclude all confounds,
2This organization is called “One-School”, website: http://one-school.org.
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it has fewer than preceding studies. Both groups in this study come from China.
Except for substantial differences in their household income, these two groups share
many demographic traits such as age, education level, and cultural background.
Although several factors may have contributed to the observed difference, the differ-
ence in their household income is very likely one of them. This is supported by the
following observation. When looking at the subsample which consists only of ado-
lescents whose household income is between the minimum of the urban group and
the maximum of the rural group (i.e., where the rural and urban groups’ income over-
lap), the rural-urban difference in ambiguity aversion is smaller than that in the rest
of the sample.
Besides ambiguity aversion, this paper also investigates another important com-
ponent of ambiguity attitude — a-insensitivity (Tversky and Fox 1995). Prevailing
empirical findings show that people are usually a-insensitive, not being able to suffi-
ciently discriminate between different levels of likelihood (Wakker 2010; Trautmann
and van de Kuilen 2015). Ambiguity aversion reflects how much people dislike
ambiguity from a motivational perspective, whereas a-insensitivity captures to what
extent people understand the ambiguous decision situation from a cognitive perspec-
tive. Many studies, both empirical and theoretical, have shown that a-insensitivity
is crucial in explaining the prevalent empirical patterns (Tversky and Wakker 1995;
Gonzalez and Wu 1999; Viscusi and Chesson 1999; Kilka and Weber 2001; Vis-
cusi and Evans 2006; Abdellaoui et al. 2011; Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015;
Dimmock et al. 2016b).
This paper is the first to measure a-insensitivity in the developing world. Both
rural and urban adolescents were a-insensitive but rural adolescents were more so.
Among the rural adolescents, the poorer were even more a-insensitive, whereas the
opposite effect was found among the urban adolescents. Although some authors have
argued for a normative basis to ambiguity aversion (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989),
such arguments are hard to conceive for a-insensitivity and have never been advanced.
A-insensitivity is often regarded as a cognitive bias due to insufficient understand-
ing of the uncertainties, and is therefore considered to be irrational. People who are
a-insensitive are more susceptible to suboptimal decisions, such as not being able
to sufficiently incorporate new information into decision making, overinvesting in
low likelihood ambiguous opportunities, or overinvesting in removing ambiguity but
not taking enough preventive measures to reduce ambiguity where it cannot be com-
pletely removed. In this sense, a more a-insensitive decision maker is equipped with
less ability to cope with ambiguity.
The clear classification of a-insensitivity as irrational and its negative economic
consequences make it especially interesting to study a-insensitivity among the poor
in the developing world. Our findings on a-insensitivity suggest that both extremes,
the poorest and the richest, are worse at dealing with ambiguity. However, the poor
with extra financial constraints will suffer more from the negative consequences than
the rich. On the positive side, the cognitive nature of a-insensitivity makes it eas-
ier to be reduced with proper decision aids — it is easier for people to learn about
their cognitive mistakes than the emotional ones. Therefore policy makers aiming to
improve people’s decisions under uncertainty may want to focus more on reducing
a-insensitivity.
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2 Measurement of ambiguity attitudes
This paper applies the elicitation method introduced by Baillon et al. (2017b) which
provides quantitative measures of people’s deviations from ambiguity neutrality. The
advantage of having quantitative measures is that it helps us better understand what
contributes most to these deviations (Viscusi 1995). We will consider the natural
source of ambiguity generated by language, where the term source refers to events
generated by the same mechanism of uncertainty (Tversky and Fox 1995; Chew and
Sagi 2008; Abdellaoui et al. 2011). For example, in the Ellsberg two-color experi-
ment, events concerning the known urn constitute one source of uncertainty (risk),
whereas events concerning the unknown urn constitute another one. In this study,
events concerning the true meaning of phrases in foreign languages constitute natu-
ral sources of uncertainty. Here is an example of an ambiguous source generated by
a Dutch phrase:
Let op.
One of the following three phrases represents its true meaning:3
(1) pay attention (2) upward (3) give up.
A decision maker with no knowledge of Dutch, who therefore sees no reason to
believe one alternative to be more likely than another, may find this ambiguity sim-
ilar to the ambiguity generated by the unknown color composition in the Ellsberg
paradox. When measuring ambiguity attitudes using artificial events, the symmetry
assumption (all events are symmetric and are hence equally likely) is often used to
control for beliefs (Dimmock et al. 2015, 2016b). But this symmetry does not hold in
general for natural ambiguity sources. For instance, in our example, a decision maker
who sees connections between Dutch and languages that he knows (for instance
English) may have reasons to believe one phrase to be more likely than another. The
potential asymmetry in beliefs makes it more difficult to control for decision mak-
ers’ beliefs when eliciting their ambiguity attitudes. This difficulty is overcome by
Baillon et al. (2017b)’s method.
This study considers six sources of ambiguity generated by phrases in the Shang-
hai dialect of Chinese, the Beijing dialect of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, English, and
Dutch, respectively. The uncertainty about the true meaning of every phrase gener-
ates one source of uncertainty. Probabilistic sophistication (Machina and Schmeidler
1992) is assumed within each source (Chew and Sagi 2008; Abdellaoui et al. 2011).
For every source, let Ei (i = 1, 2, 3) denote the event that the ith alternative meaning
is the true meaning of the Dutch phrase in Chinese. For instance, in the preced-
ing example, E1 denotes the event: the true meaning of “let op” is “pay attention”.
By definition, the Ei’s are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, as one and only one
of the three different alternatives is the true meaning. The union of two events:
Ei ∪ Ej(i = j) is denoted Eij , i = j . Events Ei are referred to as single events and
their unions Eij as composite events. In the experiment, subjects were asked to report
their matching probabilities defined next.
3Original instructions were presented to subjects in Chinese.
J Risk Uncertain
For every event E (Ei or Eij ) and fixed outcome4 X > 0, let XE0 denote an
ambiguous lottery that pays X if E happens and 0 otherwise. Similarly, let Xq0
denote a risky lottery that pays X with probability q and 0 with probability 1 − q.
Definition 1 The matching probability m (mi or mij ) of an event E (Ei or Eij ) is the
probability such that the decision maker is indifferent between prospects XE0 and
Xm0.
In the experiment, the matching probability of an event is elicited using a choice
list (see Section 3.3 for details). A decision maker’s matching probability m of an
eventE reflects his subjective evaluation of the likelihood of eventE, but distorted by
his ambiguity attitude. Using matching probabilities, it is possible to measure ambi-
guity attitudes without the need to control for risk attitude (Dimmock et al. 2016b,
Theorem 3.1). Let p (pi or pij ) denote the decision maker’s subjective probability of
E (Ei or Eij ), which is assumed to be an additive probability measure within every
source (justified by Chew and Sagi 2008 and Abdellaoui et al. 2011, who reconciled
it with the Ellsberg paradox). For an ambiguity neutral decision maker, m = p for
all events. For an ambiguity-averse decision maker, his dislike of the ambiguity con-
cerning his subjective probability p makes him willing to sacrifice a positive amount
of winning probability to get rid of this ambiguity. As a result,m < p. The difference
between his matching probability m and his subjective probability p can be inter-
preted as an ambiguity premium. This concept of ambiguity premium is analogous
to that of risk premium, where risk-averse decision makers are willing to pay the risk
premium (in money) to avoid risk. Similarly, ambiguity averse decision makers are
willing to pay an ambiguity premium (in winning probability) to avoid ambiguity.
To derive a decision maker’s ambiguity attitude from the elicited matching proba-
bilities, we need to control for his subjective probabilities. To this end, six matching
probabilities were elicited for all single (E1, E2, and E3) and composite (E12, E23,
and E13) events for every source of uncertainty. For an ambiguity neutral decision
maker, we know that m1 + m2 + m3 = 1 and m12 + m23 + m31 = 2 without the
need to know his subjective probabilities. Deviations from these ambiguity neutral
benchmarks then give information about the decision makers’ ambiguity attitudes.
For instance, if a decision maker is ambiguity averse then m1 + m2 + m3 < 1 and
m12 + m23 + m31 < 2.
Let ms = (m1 + m2 + m3)/3 denote the average matching probability of single
events, and let mc = (m12 + m13 + m23)/3 denote the average matching probability
of composite events. Under ambiguity neutrality, ms + mc = 1.
Definition 2 The ambiguity aversion index is:
b = 1 − (ms + mc). (1)
4In the experiment, X = 40 RMB. At the time of the experiment, this was about 6.5 USD and 5 EUR.
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The ambiguity aversion index captures how much a decision maker dislikes an
ambiguous source on average relative to risk. The index measures the average devi-
ation from ambiguity neutrality in the decision maker’s matching probabilities of
single and composite events. Under ambiguity aversion, the index is positive (b > 0),
implying that the decision maker is willing to pay a positive ambiguity premium to
avoid ambiguity. Similarly, ambiguity seeking implies a negative index (b < 0), and
ambiguity neutrality implies b = 0. The ambiguity aversion index coincides with
a number of measures of ambiguity aversion proposed in the literature (Schmeidler
1989; Dow and da Costa Werlang 1992), where in the specific models considered by
theses authors, expected utility is assumed for risk. The current measure of ambiguity
aversion extends these measures to the general case.
Knowing how ambiguity averse/seeking decision makers are on average does
not give us the full picture of their ambiguity attitudes. Empirical findings suggest
that people are often ambiguity seeking for low likelihood events and ambiguity
averse for high likelihood events (Kahn and Sarin 1988; Viscusi 1989; Hogarth and
Einhorn 1990; Tversky and Fox 1995; Wakker 2010; Baillon et al. 2012; Traut-
mann and van de Kuilen 2015; Dimmock et al. 2016b). This likelihood-dependence
of ambiguity aversion was predicted by Ellsberg (1961, 2011). However, it cannot
be captured by the ambiguity aversion index. Hence, a second index of ambigu-
ity attitude that can capture likelihood-dependence is defined: ambiguity-generated
likelihood insensitivity (a-insensitivity).
Definition 3 The a-insensitivity index is:
a = 1 − (3mc − 3ms). (2)
The a-insensitivity index captures the sensitivity of a decision maker to changes
in likelihood within an ambiguous source (e.g. when going from single to composite
events). Under perfect sensitivity when the decision maker is ambiguity neutral, the
difference between 3mc and 3ms is exactly 1, giving a = 0. The common finding in
the literature is that people are a-insensitive and therefore do not differentiate suffi-
ciently between different levels of likelihood. More specifically, they tend to report
a relatively low value of mc and a relatively high value of ms , resulting in a positive
index (a > 0). In the extreme insensitive case when people treat all ambiguous events
as fifty-fifty, we have ms = mc = 0.5, and therefore a = 1. The common finding
of a-insensitivity can be interpreted as people’s misunderstanding of the ambiguous
decision situation. People seem to have difficulty understanding different levels of
likelihoods, especially for low likelihood events (Zeckhauser and Viscusi 1990).
The ambiguity aversion index and the a-insensitivity index capture two psycholog-
ically independent components of ambiguity attitude. The former can be interpreted
as emotional, reflecting people’s genuine (dis-)like of ambiguous situations, whereas
the latter is cognitive, reflecting people’s understanding of ambiguous situations. The
two components together depict a comprehensive picture of people’s ambiguity atti-
tude. Empirically, models with these two components have been shown to have better
predicative power than others (Kothiyal et al. 2014).
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3 Experimental design
3.1 Subjects
The experiment consisted of a rural and an urban session, both run in China. The
rural session was in Wuding, one of the poorest counties in Yunan province. Students
(n1 = 89, average age 17.4) in grade 11 or 12 at Wuding No.1 Middle School,
who were receiving financial support from the non-governmental organization “One-
School” of an amount ranging from 800 RMB to 2000 RMB5 per semester, were
selected. The urban session was run in Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei province. It is
the most populous city in Central China, whose GDP ranked 9th in 2012 nationwide.
Two classes of students (n2 = 91, average age 16.1) were randomly selected in grade
11 at Donghu Middle School. They mostly came from middle class households.
Both sessions were conducted in November 2013 during regular school hours,
with permission from principals and coordinating teachers at the participating
schools. No student opted out.
3.2 Procedure
The experiment was a paper-pencil based classroom experiment. Both written and
oral instructions were provided by the author, with information on the experimental
procedure, the payment process, and a typical choice task for illustration.
All subjects in the same session started the experiment at the same time. They
faced 36 choice lists, 13 demographic questions, and 5 cognitive reflection questions
(Frederick 2005).6 After finishing, they raised their hands to notify the experimenter,
and were then guided to the payment desk, where each subject played out one of
their choices for real. Payments were handled by assistants recruited locally. Original
experimental material and its English translation are in the Online Appendix.
3.3 Stimuli: choice lists
Figure 1 presents a typical choice list. As explained in Section 2, the ambiguous
source was generated by the uncertainty about the true meaning of an unknown
phrase. The risky source was generated by a random draw of a number from a box
containing 100 tickets numbered from 1 to 100.
It was explained to the subjects that, for each risky lottery (Lottery A), there was
a set of winning numbers. If the random number drawn is one of the winning num-
bers, the risky lottery pays 40 yuan; otherwise, it pays nothing. Similarly, for each
ambiguous lottery (Lottery B), there was a set of winning meanings. If the true
meaning of the phrase is one of the winning meanings, the ambiguous lottery pays
40 yuan; otherwise, it pays nothing. By construction, every set of winning numbers
5The tuition fee for one semester is around RMB 1500 per student, and the lowest sustainable monthly
living expense is about RMB 400 per student.
6Out of the 5 cognitive reflection questions, three were the original ones from Frederick (2005), and two
were designed by the author in the same spirit.
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Fig. 1 An example of a choice list
corresponds to a winning probability, whereas every set of winning meanings
corresponds to an ambiguous event.
In each line of the choice list, subjects specified which one of the two lotteries
they preferred. Within the same choice list, risky lotteries became better as the total
number of valid winning numbers (the number 0 in the first row of the choice list is
not a valid winning number) increased, while the ambiguous lottery stayed the same.
Across different choice lists, the ambiguous events differed. Subjects who satisfied
monotonicity preferred the ambiguous lottery when the winning probability of the
risky lottery was small, and preferred the risky lottery when the winning probability
was big enough. The midpoint of the two lines where their preference switched was
taken as their matching probability.
Six phrases from the Beijing dialect (BJ) of Chinese, the Shanghai dialect (SH) of
Chinese, Japanese (JP), English (EN), Korean (KR), and Dutch (NL), respectively,
were used. The phrases were chosen so that the vast majority of the subjects would
not know their true meanings in Chinese. All phrases were presented in the original
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language.7 For each phrase, six choice lists were used to elicit the matching probabil-
ities of all six events. In total, there were thirty-six choice lists. All subjects received
the same thirty-six choice lists but in three different orders.8
3.4 Incentives
Every subject received a show-up fee of 20 RMB and, in addition, played out one
of the choices for real using the procedure described below. Each experimental ses-
sion (including instruction and payment) lasted about one hour. The average payment
(including show-up fee) was 41 RMB in the rural session and 42 RMB in the urban
session.
Choices in the experiment were incentivized using a random incentive system.
At the end of the experiment, each subject first drew two numbers, and then played
out his choice for real in the corresponding line in the corresponding choice list
determined by these two numbers.
4 Results
In total, 5% of the subjects (7 in the rural session and 2 in the urban session) had
incomplete choice lists (2% of all choice lists). These choices were recorded as
missing.
4.1 Multiple switching
In the rural session, 26.8% of the choices had multiple switching points; while the
percentage is 4.6% in the urban session.9 The rate of multiple switching is higher in
the rural session than in the urban session (p < 0.01). In the analyses reported in
the main text, choices with multiple switching points were excluded. After exclusion,
151 subjects remained. These exclusions do not affect the main results (Appendix B).
Multiple switching points entail a violation of monotonicity. Understanding the
decision tasks and behaving in accordance with the monotonicity principle requires
cognitive ability. Comparing the performance of the urban and rural adolescents in
Frederick’s cognitive reflection test, the urban group answered on average 70% of
the questions correctly, while the rate of correct responses was only 40% in the
rural group.10 The negative correlation (− 0.215, p < 0.01) between the cognitive
7The Japanese phrase was presented in its Kanji form. These Kanji characters are also meaningful
characters in modern Chinese.
8Three different orders were used: (BJ, SH, JP, EN, KR, NL); (JP, EN, KR, NL, BJ, SH); and (KR, NL,
BJ, SH, JP, EN).
9Field data commonly contains more noise than controlled lab data. See Section 4 of Dimmock et al.
(2016b) for a discussion.
10We also looked at the rate of correct response to the 3 original cognitive reflection test questions. The
mean CRT score was 2.1 for urban students, which is slightly lower than MIT students and much higher
than Princeton students reported in Frederick (2005). The rural students scored 1.08, which is lower than
students from University of Michigan: Ann Harbor, but higher than Bowling Green University.
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reflection test score and the number of multiple switching points suggests that lower
cognitive ability results in more irrational choices.
4.2 Matching probabilities
Figure 2 shows the boxplots of single event matching probabilities. The light bar
represents the matching probabilities of the true events. Subjects were not always
equally willing to bet on the three events. For instance, for the Shanghai dialect,
subjects were more willing to bet on the true event than for the other two events.
Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that matching probabilities for the three events were
not equal for the Shanghai dialect, the Beijing dialect, Japanese, and Korean (p <
0.01, p = 0.014, p < 0.01, and p < 0.01, respectively). But this was not the
case for the two western languages: English and Dutch (p = 0.20 and p = 0.17
respectively). Since these matching probabilities capture subjects’ subjective beliefs
(although distorted by their ambiguity attitudes) about each event happening, it shows
that subjects had stronger opinions about one event being true (or untrue) for Asian
languages, even though they may not always be right — for instance, in the case of
Korean.
The asymmetry in beliefs for Asian languages shows that the often assumed sym-
metry in beliefs in experiments with artificial ambiguity sources does not hold in this
Fig. 2 Boxplots of single event matching probabilities. The light grey box indicates the true event.
Horizontal dashed lines indicate p = 1/3
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experiment. The ambiguity attitudes measurements in this paper are, however, not
affected by such violations as the Baillon et al. (2017b) method adopted here pro-
vides control for beliefs without the need for the symmetry assumption. Summary
statistics of the matching probabilities, the two ambiguity attitude indices, and other
demographic variables are in Table 1.
4.3 Income effect within the urban and the rural sample
Within each group, the income variation is big (see Table 1), but adolescents are
expected to be rather homogeneous on unobserved factors, such as parents’ education
Table 1 Summary statistics
Urban Rural
Mean Med. Std Min Max Mean Med. Std Min Max
m1 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.00 1.00
m2 0.49 0.42 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.38 0.26 0.00 1.00
m3 0.38 0.38 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.38 0.25 0.00 1.00
m12 0.65 0.62 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.58 0.27 0.00 1.00
m23 0.64 0.62 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.52 0.26 0.00 1.00
m13 0.55 0.58 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.58 0.27 0.00 1.00
ms 0.41 0.38 0.17 0.00 0.96 0.40 0.38 0.20 0.00 1.00
mc 0.61 0.64 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.57 0.57 0.21 0.00 1.00
b 0.02 0.00 0.29 − 1.00 0.81 − 0.05 − 0.07 0.32 − 1.00 1.00
a − 0.38 − 0.40 0.53 − 2.00 2.00 − 0.50 − 0.55 0.55 − 3.96 1.53
age 16.14 16.00 0.55 15.00 18.00 17.42 17.50 0.81 15.00 19.00
male 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
income 1.06 0.80 1.30 0.10 8.00 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.70
tv 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.18 0.00 1.00
internet 0.99 1.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00
no.sib 0.46 0.00 0.83 0.00 4.00 1.10 1.00 0.59 0.00 5.00
grade 68.33 67.78 5.60 54.11 82.22 64.98 64.89 8.12 46.89 85.78
fav.lan 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
crt 0.70 0.60 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.40 0.28 0.00 1.00
This table presents summary statistics of the following variables: mi , i ∈ {1, 2, 3} are the matching prob-
abilities for single events; mij are matching probabilities for the corresponding composite events; ms :
average matching probability of single events; mc: average matching probability of composite events; b:
index of ambiguity aversion; a: index of a-insensitivity; age; male: a dummy variable taking value 1 if
male; household income in 10,000RMB; tv: a dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject has a TV set at
home; internet: a dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject has a computer with internet access; no.sib:
number of siblings; grade: average grades in the latest exam as percentage of maximum grade; fav.lan (lan-
guage as favorite course): dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject stated Chinese or English (or both)
as two of his favorite courses at school in the questionnaire; and crt: the percentage of correct answers in
the cognitive reflection test
J Risk Uncertain
Fig. 3 Boxplots of ambiguity attitude indices for rural subjects in each income quartile
and access to information. For instance, almost everyone in the urban group and
almost no one in the rural group reported having access to the internet.11
Figure 3 (Fig. 4) shows the boxplot of the two ambiguity attitude indices for rural
(urban) subjects in each income quartile. A decreasing trend is observed for rural
subjects for ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity. For the urban subjects, no clear
trend is observed for ambiguity aversion and a slightly increasing trend is observed
for a-insensitivity.
Table 2 reports regression results of ambiguity attitude indices on demographic
variables for rural and urban adolescents separately. Standard errors are clustered
at the individual level to control for potential correlation of observations from
the same subject. Odd-numbered models included only household income (total
household income of the core family in 10,000 RMB) as an explanatory variable,
whereas even numbered models included other demographic variables such as gen-
der (male = 1 if male), age, number of siblings (no.sib), their performance in the
cognitive reflection test (crt), their performance in the most recent exam at school
(grade), whether they listed language courses as their favorite courses at school
(fav.lan = 1), and their ranking (1 to 6) of the six dialects/language according
to their familiarity (rank), where a higher rank corresponds with a less familiar
language.
Table 3 reports regression results with the urban and rural data pooled together
where interactions of all variables with the urban dummy are included. The coeffi-
cients of the interaction terms show whether the demographic variables have different
impacts on ambiguity attitudes for rural than the urban adolescents.
Income has a negative effect (marginally significant) on ambiguity aversion for
rural adolescents. It becomes more significant after controlling for other demographic
11This variable is not included in the regression due to lack of variance within group, and because it is
almost perfectly correlated with the location variable.
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Fig. 4 Boxplots of ambiguity attitude indices for urban subjects in each income quartile
variables. However, it has no impact on the urban adolescents’ ambiguity aversion.12
The significant interaction effect of urban and income (Table 3) confirms that the
negative income effect on ambiguity aversion is weaker for urban adolescents than
for their rural counterparts. As for income effect on a-insensitivity, it is negative
for rural adolescents but positive for the urban adolescents.13 Both effects remain
significant after controlling for other demographic variables. Regression results in
Tables 2 and 3 show that income has an opposite impact on a-insensitivity for urban
adolescents than for their rural counterparts.
There is no gender difference and only a weak age effect on ambiguity aversion
for urban adolescents. Number of siblings does not have any impact on people’s
ambiguity attitudes. Rural adolescents who score high in tests at school are more
ambiguity seeking, and urban adolescents with higher grades are more a-insensitive.
What is more, the familiarity ranking has a positive impact on rural adolescents’ a-
insensitivity, suggesting that rural adolescents tend to be more sensitive to sources
that they are more familiar with. Lastly, rural adolescents who listed English or
Chinese (or both) as their favorite courses at school tend to be more a-insensitive,
and this effect is not significant among urban adolescents.
4.4 Ambiguity attitudes: Rural and urban comparison
This section compares ambiguity attitudes between the two groups of Chinese
adolescents.
12In the pooled regressions (Table 3), the net income effect on urban adolescents’ ambiguity aversion is the
same as the effect reported in Table 2: − 0.018 (standard error: 0.017) in model (1) and − 0.022 (standard
error: 0.014) in model (2). Income has no significant effect on ambiguity aversion in the urban group.
13In the pooled regression (Table 3), the net income effect on urban adolescents’ a-insensitivity is the same
as the effect reported in Table 2: 0.046 (standard error: 0.014) in model (3) and 0.069 (standard error:
0.019) in model (4). It has a positive effect on a-insensitivity in the urban group.
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Table 2 Ambiguity attitudes: Urban and rural separate
Ambiguity aversion A-insensitivity
Rural Urban Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
income − 0.609∗ − 0.505∗∗ − 0.018 − 0.022 − 1.167∗∗∗ − 1.391∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.243) (0.017) (0.017) (0.294) (0.308) (0.014) (0.019)
male − 0.018 0.004 − 0.012 0.044
(0.077) (0.072) (0.093) (0.122)
age 0.012 − 0.076∗ − 0.006 0.123
(0.047) (0.043) (0.047) (0.082)
no.sib − 0.040 − 0.027 0.055 − 0.030
(0.055) (0.039) (0.098) (0.108)
crt 0.021 − 0.197 − 0.254 0.247
(0.150) (0.140) (0.166) (0.214)
grade − 0.008∗∗ 0.001 0.007 0.018∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
fav.lan − 0.028 − 0.012 0.225∗∗ − 0.016
(0.085) (0.077) (0.089) (0.124)
rank 0.008 0.003 0.033∗∗ 0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.011)
Constant 0.136∗∗ 0.506 0.0003 1.303 0.651∗∗∗ 0.088 0.308∗∗∗ − 3.167∗
(0.053) (0.882) (0.046) (0.880) (0.063) (0.894) (0.069) (1.641)
Observations 269 261 342 341 269 261 342 341
R2 0.040 0.100 0.007 0.047 0.051 0.137 0.012 0.049
Explanation of the number of observations: for each subject, to calculate his ambiguity attitude indices to
an ambiguous source, it is necessary that he does not have multiple switching in all six choice lists for that
source. If multiple switching occurs in one of the six choice lists, his choices concerning the ambiguity
source will be excluded. His choices concerning other ambiguity sources can still be included as long as
there are no multiple switching in those choice lists. For some subjects, some demographic information is
missing. In the regression models, only observations with all variables available are included
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level
Ambiguity aversion index Figure 5a depicts the mean value of the ambiguity aver-
sion indices for different sources and an average index for all sources. Overall, urban
adolescents had negative ambiguity aversion (p = 0.02 in a two-sided Wilcoxon
signed-rank test), exhibiting ambiguity seeking; whereas rural adolescents exhibited
ambiguity aversion (p < 0.01). Accordingly, the urban adolescents had a higher
ambiguity aversion than the rural adolescents (p < 0.01). Across different sources
generated by the six phrases, there is no difference in ambiguity aversion across
sources (χ2(5) = 5.41, p = 0.37 in Friedman test).
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Table 3 Urban and rural pooled with interaction terms
Dependent variable:
Ambiguity aversion A-insensitivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
urban − 0.136∗ 0.797 − 0.343∗∗∗ − 3.255∗
(0.070) (1.246) (0.094) (1.869)
income − 0.609∗ − 0.505∗∗ − 1.167∗∗∗ − 1.391∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.243) (0.294) (0.308)
male − 0.018 − 0.012
(0.077) (0.093)
age 0.012 − 0.006
(0.047) (0.047)
no.sib − 0.040 0.055
(0.055) (0.098)
crt 0.021 − 0.254
(0.150) (0.166)
grade − 0.008∗∗ 0.007
(0.004) (0.005)
fav.lan − 0.028 0.225∗∗
(0.085) (0.089)
rank 0.008 0.033∗∗
(0.007) (0.015)
urban:income 0.591∗ 0.483∗∗ 1.213∗∗∗ 1.460∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.244) (0.294) (0.309)
urban:male 0.022 0.055
(0.106) (0.154)
urban:age − 0.088 0.128
(0.064) (0.094)
urban:no.sib 0.013 − 0.085
(0.068) (0.146)
urban:crt − 0.218 0.501∗
(0.205) (0.271)
urban:grade 0.009 0.011
(0.007) (0.010)
urban:fav.lan 0.016 − 0.241
(0.115) (0.152)
urban:rank − 0.005 − 0.025
(0.009) (0.018)
Constant 0.136∗∗ 0.506 0.651∗∗∗ 0.088
(0.053) (0.882) (0.063) (0.894)
Observations 611 602 611 602
R2 0.040 0.100 0.048 0.102
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level
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Ambiguity Aversiona b A-insensitivity
Fig. 5 Means of ambiguity attitude indices. Error bars indicate the 90% confidence interval
A-insensitivity index Figure 5b depicts the mean value of the a-insensitivity indices.
Both urban and rural adolescents had positive a-insensitivity indices (all p-values
< 0.01 in two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests), exhibiting substantial insensitivity
to changes in different levels of likelihood. Rural adolescents were less sensitive to
changes in likelihood than urban adolescents (p < 0.01 in a two-sided Wilcoxon
rank-sum test). Comparing subjects’ a-insensitivity in different sources, there is no
difference (χ2(5) = 5.72, p = 0.33, in Friedman test).
The between-group tests in Section 4.4 treat all observations as independent. In
Section 4.5, a non-linear random coefficient model is estimated to check for robust-
ness while allowing for potential correlation of observations from the same subject.
All significant differences remain significant.
As in other studies, factors other than income may have contributed to the differ-
ence in ambiguity attitudes between the two groups. To provide more insight into
the contribution of income to the observed differences in ambiguity attitudes, the full
sample is divided into two parts: one subsample with only adolescents from house-
holds whose income is between the minimum of the urban group and the maximum
of the rural group — where the two groups’ income overlap, and the rest form the
other subsample. The subsample with income overlap consists of 52 subjects (out of
151 after excluding subjects with multiple switching), where 28 come from the urban
group.
Figure 6 presents the comparison between urban and rural subjects in the two sub-
samples. The urban rural difference in ambiguity aversion is smaller in the subsample
with overlap than in the subsample without (p = 0.05 for the interaction effect of
urban and overlap14 in ANOVA). The same holds for a-insensitivity (p < 0.01).
14Overlap is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation comes from the subsample with income
overlap.
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Fig. 6 Means of ambiguity attitude indices for sub-sample and for the rest. Error bars indicate the 90%
confidence interval
This shows that differences in income have contributed to the observed rural-urban
differences in ambiguity attitudes.
4.5 Robustness
To account for errors, a non-linear random coefficient model with Fechner errors
(Becker et al. 1963; Hey and Orme 1994) is used. This model estimates the distribu-
tion of the individual-specific ambiguity attitude indices and subjective probabilities
with pooling data (Appendix A).
The estimation results assuming stochastic preferences are similar to the regres-
sion results in Table 3. Coefficients differ slightly, but all the main patterns remain:
the urban adolescents were more ambiguity seeking and less insensitive to likelihood
changes than their rural counterpart on average. The findings on the relationship
between income and ambiguity attitudes within each group also remain.
5 Discussion
This paper investigates the relationship between income and people’s ambiguity atti-
tudes among two groups of Chinese adolescents. Table 4 gives a summary of prior
studies on people’s ambiguity attitudes in the developing world. These studies on
ambiguity attitudes in the developing world focused on the implications of people’s
ambiguity attitudes on their real life decisions. Most of them found people to be ambi-
guity averse. In the current study, the poor rural adolescents were ambiguity averse.
However, the rich urban adolescents were ambiguity seeking. Given the vast litera-
ture suggesting that ambiguity aversion is universal, the finding of urban adolescents
being ambiguity seeking may seem surprising. However, many recent studies have
shown that ambiguity seeking is more common than traditionally thought (Chesson
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Table 4 Prior literature summary
Paper Location Ambiguity Income/Wealth More AA
Aversion Effect on AA people are:
Akay et al. (2012) Ethiopia AA No (land size;
consumption)
–
Alpizar et al. (2011) Costa Rica AAa – more
willingness to
insure
Cardenas and Carpenter
(2013)
Latin Americab AA No (number of
income earner;
home size)
less happy
Engle-Warnick et al.
(2011)
Peru AA No (land size) less likely to
diversify crop
varieties
Ross et al. (2012) Lao PDR AN – less likely to
adopt new
crops
aThey could only classify 31 farmers out of 175 in the sample. Among the 31, 21 were ambiguity averse
and the other 10 were either neutral or seeking
bThe study was conducted in six capital cities in Latin America: Bogota´, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima,
Montevideo, and San Jose´
and Viscusi 2003; Binmore et al. 2012; Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015; Kocher
et al. 2015).
The current study is the first to measure a-insensitivity in the developing world.
Both urban and rural Chinese adolescents are a-insensitive, but the rural adoles-
cents are more so. Measuring and understanding a-insensitivity is of special interest
for studying developmental issues, as a better understanding of people’s behavioral
biases can provide guidance on designs of more effective interventions. For instance,
there has been a persistent under-adoption of bed net15 in low income countries,
even though its benefit in malaria prevention has been shown to be substantial. A-
insensitivity can provide an explanation and accordingly policy intervention for this
issue. Considering an extremely a-insensitive person, as long as the bed net does not
fully eliminate the chances of getting infected, he will not be willing to invest in
such a prevention because uncertainty reduction without elimination is immaterial to
him. For such a person, the often used intervention through social influence would
not work because one single case of infection after adoption of bed net will demoti-
vate him from purchasing. For a less extreme person, the effect is not so dramatic but
the under-evaluation is still present. If a-insensitivity affects people’s willingness to
take up preventive measures, then interventions that aim to reduce a-insensitivity can
improve their effectiveness.
15A bed net is a net hung around the bed that provides protection against diseases often carried by insects,
such as mosquitos.
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Previous studies on the relationship between income/wealth and people’s ambigu-
ity attitudes found little or no evidence (Table 4). This study showed an interesting
reversal income effect on ambiguity attitudes. Among the rural adolescents, the
poorer are more ambiguity averse and a-insensitive. However, among the urban
adolescents, the richer are more a-insensitive. This reversal suggests a non-linear
dependence of people’s ambiguity attitudes on household income, and the impact
is much higher when income is low than when it is high. One possible explanation
is that lives of the extremely poor (rich) life are almost surely bad (good), whereas
for those in the middle, their own abilities and efforts may open up opportunities to
change their future life perspectives. Therefore, adolescents from families with mod-
erate income are more motivated in developing their own capabilities, including their
abilities in dealing with ambiguity.
For the poorer rural group, the finding that an increase in income may lead to
a decrease in ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity sheds new light on the prob-
lem of the poverty trap. Previous studies in the developing world have shown that
more ambiguity averse people are more likely to over-insure, less likely to diver-
sify crop variety, and less likely to adopt new technologies (Table 4). Although
only a few empirical studies in the developed world (Dimmock et al. 2016b) and
none in the developing world investigated how a-insensitivity impacts people’s real
life decisions, as argued before, a-insensitivity is commonly believed to be a cog-
nitive bias that underlies many suboptimal decisions. The poorer subjects in the
rural group are the extremely poor people, for whom every suboptimal decision that
they make further traps them in poverty. Mani et al. (2013) noted that: “being poor
means coping not just with a shortfall of money, but also with a concurrent short-
fall of cognitive resources. The poor, in this view, are less capable not because of
inherent traits, but because the very context of poverty imposes load and impedes
cognitive capacity.” If the relationship found in this study between income and ambi-
guity attitudes is causal, it then suggests that financial aid provided to the extremely
poor will, among others, substantially help them improve their decisions made under
ambiguity.
Methodologically, this paper contributes to ambiguity theory by demonstrating
how the Baillon et al. (2017b) method can be easily adapted to study different natural
ambiguity sources. For field studies, making the experimental tasks comprehensible
to the usually non-academic subject pool has been one major challenge in experi-
mental design. This paper enhances subjects’ comprehension of experimental tasks
by using a decision context that is similar to what they often encounter in real life.
None of the subjects had prior experience in participating in economic experiments.
Given the special attention paid by the Chinese culture to education, both groups of
subjects spent an enormous amount (from 7am till 8pm, six days a week) of time at
school studying. Their knowledge outside of school life is therefore limited. The lan-
guage questions were not very different than the English exercises at school, and the
lotteries were presented as a coupon lottery that they sometimes play during the new
year celebration at school. Hence, the experimental tasks in this study were adapted
to be as comprehensible as possible for the subjects.
The finding of no gender difference in ambiguity attitudes was consistent with pre-
vious findings (Borghans et al. 2009; Sutter et al. 2013). Rural adolescents with better
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school performance were more ambiguity seeking. This differs from the findings in
Sutter et al. (2013), where Austrian children and adolescents with better German
grades were more ambiguity averse. On the other hand, for urban adolescents, those
with better school performance were more a-insensitive. As the current study is the
first to measure a-insensitivity among adolescents, it is hard to compare this finding
with prior studies. Overall, the findings on the relationship between school perfor-
mance and ambiguity attitudes were mixed. More empirical investigations are needed
to better understand this issue.
Rural adolescents are less a-insensitive to sources that they perceived to be more
familiar with. This agrees with the competence effect, i.e. the positive impact of per-
ceived competence on a-insensitivity (Heath and Tversky 1991; Kilka and Weber
2001). Further, the positive relationship between expressed interest in learning lan-
guage (listing language courses as favorite) and a-insensitivity has implications
for the cultivation and maintenance of an interest in language learning. Affection
towards the sources of uncertainty influences decision makers’ ambiguity attitudes.
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) found that subjects were less source sensitive about
affect-rich than affect-poor outcomes. In this paper, the finding of less likelihood
sensitivity to affect-rich uncertainty sources among the rural adolescents may be due
to their psychological fragility. The realization of their limited knowledge in what
they thought they were good at makes them less confident, leading to conservatism
when expressing probabilistic judgments. As a result, they act taking uncertainties as
fifty-fifty, inducing a-insensitivity.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows how modern ambiguity models give new insights into linguistics,
development economics, and inequality. The relationships between income and the
two most relevant components of ambiguity attitude (aversion and insensitivity) were
studied among two groups of Chinese adolescents. Among the poorer rural Chinese
adolescents, those from households with higher income were both less ambiguity
averse and a-insensitive, whereas among the richer urban adolescents, ambiguity
aversion was not related to income but a-insensitivity increased with income. Com-
paring the two groups, the (urban) rich are less ambiguity averse and insensitive
to ambiguity than their (rural) poor counterparts. Among the rural poor, ambiguity
aversion and a-insensitivity decreased greatly with income.
This paper is the first to study the relationship between income dependence
and a-insensitivity in the developing countries. A-insensitivity reflects a cognitive
component of people’s ambiguity attitudes. People who are extremely a-insensitive
have the tendency to ignore changes in likelihoods and, hence, they will fail to
value the benefit of preventive measures unless these measures completely elimi-
nate the potential losses. They will also fail to value the benefit of a new technology
as long as it does not ensure a sure gain. These implications are especially con-
sequential for the poor, who have less margin for making suboptimal decisions.
Studies have shown that a-insensitivity can be improved by learning of information
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(Baillon et al. 2017a). Policies promoting adoption of preventive measures such as
a vaccine or new technology could therefore aim more at influencing a-insensitive
people. For instance, presenting the benefit in a more tangible and less uncer-
tain way can make people less insensitive to the uncertainty induced by the new
technology.
The current literature studying ambiguity attitudes in the developing world almost
exclusively focuses on ambiguity aversion. The finding of a-insensitivity in this paper
adds to this literature by providing confirming evidence of its importance in the devel-
oping world. Dimmock et al. (2016b) found that a-insensitivity has predictive power
in real life decisions. Studying the predictive power of both components of ambiguity
attitude (aversion and a-insensitivity) in real life decisions, including decisions about
saving, adoption of new technologies, farmland renting, insurance and migration, can
help us better understand income inequalities. It will also provide new insights for
policy making.
Acknowledgments I would like to thank the coordinating teachers at the participating schools and the
NGO “One-School” organization in China for making this study possible. I received helpful comments
from Peter Wakker, Utz Weitzel, Aure´lien Baillon, David Schroeder, and Vitalie Spinu. Financial sup-
port from the Tinbergen Institution and the Econometrics Institute at Erasmus School of Economics are
gratefully acknowledged.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s)
and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix A: Random coefficient model results
A decision maker’s reported matching probability is a function of his subjective prob-
ability, and his ambiguity attitudes:m = f (p, b, a). Following Baillon et al. (2017b),
we assume a linear dependence of m on p on (0, 1) throughout:
m = d + hp for 0 < p < 1. (3)
Observation A1 Assume the linear dependence as given in Eq. 3. The matching
probability is given by:
m = 0.5(a − b) + (1 − a)p (4)
Proof Consider the linear function as in Eq. 3. I show that d = 0.5(a − b) and
h = 1 − a.
Note that 3ms = 3d + h, and similarly 3mc = 3d + 2h.
By definition, a = 1 − (3mc − 3ms) = 1 − h. Hence, h = 1 − a. By definition,
b = 1 − (mc + ms) = 1 − (2d + h) = a − 2d . Hence, d = 0.5(a − b).
Hence, m = 0.5(a − b) + (1 − a)p.
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Let mkl (k = 1, ..., n, l = 1, ..., m) denote subject k’s matching probability for
event l.16 Matching probability is a function of the subject’s subjective probability
pkl , and ambiguity attitude indices bk and ak: mkl = f (pk1, pk2, bk, ak).17 Obser-
vation A1 gives one specification of the function f . To account for the possibility
that subjects report their matching probabilities with an error, the reported matching
probability is modeled as:
mkl = f (pk1, pk2, bk, ak) + kl (5)
where kl are independent of each other and follow a normal distribution with mean
0 and standard deviation σ . Error terms kl are also assumed to be independent
of the random coefficients of subjective probabilities and ambiguity attitude indices
specified as follows. Let
ηk = Xηkβη + ξηk , ηk ∈ {pk1, pk2, bk, ak} (6)
where ηk is one of the four individual specific parameters,X
η
k are 1×Kη vectors spec-
ifying kη fixed effect regressors, βη are corresponding vectors of coefficient param-
eters, and ξηk are unobserved random effects of the parameters at the individual level.
For pk1, pk2, bk and ak , one or more fixed effects are included, depending on different
model specifications.18 The random effect coefficients ξk =
(
ξ
p1
k , ξ
p2
k , ξ
b
k , ξ
a
k
)
fol-
lows a jointly normal distribution, independent of each other, and independent of Xη.
Let ξ∗ denote the standardized ξ : ξ∗ = (′)−1ξ , where ′ is the covariance matrix
of ξ , and  = Diag(σ 2
ξp1
, σ 2
ξp2
, σ 2
ξb
, σ 2ξa ).
Subject k’s likelihood contribution can be expressed as:
lk =
∫
R4
[
36∏
l=1
1
σ
φ
(
(mkl − f (pk1, pk2, bk, ak))
σ
)]
φ(ξ∗)dξ∗. (7)
The econometric specification is similar to that in von Gaudecker et al. (2011) but
differs in the following aspects. Their model was for discrete choices in every line of
choice lists. Considering that choices within the same choice list are likely correlated,
the model in this paper is specified for the stated matching probability. Therefore, the
trembling hand error term is not included. The model estimation is done using the
nlme package in R.
Three different model specifications accounting for choice errors are considered.
Source fixed effects are not included for either ambiguity aversion or a-insensitivity
because there are no significant differences in ambiguity attitudes across different
sources.19 The three models differ in the fixed effect for ambiguity aversion and
a-insensitivity. Model M0 includes only the dummy variable urban as fixed effect,
16The subscript l identifies which single or composite event (1,2,3,12,13,or 23) within that source it
concerns.
17All other probabilities can be expressed in terms of pk1 and pk2.
18Source fixed effects are included for both p1 and p2 as probability sophistication holds only within one
source (Chew and Sagi 2008; Abdellaoui et al. 2011).
19Including them has little effect on the results and does not affect main conclusions.
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Table 5 Random coefficient model: Ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity
Model M0 Model M1 Model M2
a.(Intercept) − 0.41 − 0.67 − 0.38
[0.03]*** [0.07]*** [0.40]
a.urban 0.12 0.43 0.78
[0.04]*** [0.10]*** [0.76]
a.income 1.61 1.63
[0.52]*** [0.51]***
a.grade − 0.00
[0.01]
a.rank − 0.02
[0.02]
a.fav.lan − 0.27
[0.10]***
a.urban:income − 1.65 − 1.67
[0.53]*** [0.51]***
a.urban:grade − 0.01
[0.01]
a.urban:rank 0.00
[0.02]
a.urban:fav.lan 0.30
[0.14]**
b.(Intercept) − 0.04 − 0.11 − 0.31
[0.02]** [0.05]** [0.26]
b.urban 0.06 0.10 0.54
[0.02]*** [0.07] [0.49]
b.income 0.66 0.70
[0.35]* [0.33]**
b.grade 0.00
[0.00]
b.rank − 0.01
[0.01]
b.fav.lan 0.08
[0.06]
b.urban:income − 0.64 − 0.68
[0.35]* [0.33]**
b.urban:grade − 0.01
[0.01]
b.urban:rank 0.01
[0.01]
b.urban:fav.lan − 0.08
[0.09]
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Table 5 (continued)
Model M0 Model M1 Model M2
σξa 0.09 0.33 0.32
σξb 0.11 0.26 0.24
σ 0.25 0.22 0.22
Log.Lik − 396.75 36.71 42.02
No.Obs 5443 4225 4190
Entries starting with sp.(a.) followed by a variable name reports the fixed effect estimates of the variable
for ambiguity aversion (a-insensitivity). Fixed and random effect results on p1 and p2 are in Table 6.
Number of observations in Model M1 andM2 are smaller than inM0 due to missing values of self-reported
demographic variables. It is about 6 times of the number of observations in Model 1 andModel 2 in Table 3
for the following two reasons. In Model 1, every index is calculated based on 6 matching probabilities,
so 6 matching probabilities give 1 observation. Whereas in Model M1 and M2, every matching probablity
is taken as one observation. Moreover, in Model 1 and 2, indices were calculated only if all 6 matching
probabilities were non-missing. However, in Model M1 and M2, this restriction no longer applies
Table 6 Random coefficient
model: p1 and p2 Model M0 Model M1 Model M2
p1.BJ 0.31 0.25 0.26
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p1.SH 0.29 0.38 0.38
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p1.EN 0.30 0.26 0.26
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p1.JP 0.32 0.31 0.31
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p1.KR 0.31 0.24 0.23
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p1.NL 0.33 0.37 0.37
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p2.BJ 0.43 0.43 0.43
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p2.SH 0.40 0.37 0.37
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p2.EN 0.39 0.43 0.42
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p2.JP 0.36 0.37 0.37
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p2.KR 0.38 0.50 0.50
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
p2.NL 0.39 0.36 0.37
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
σξp1 0.12 0.07 0.07
σξp2 0.14 0.08 0.09
Entries starting with p1.(p2.)
followed by a variable name
reports the fixed effect estimates
of each source (identified by the
language) for p1 and p2
J Risk Uncertain
which also accounts for potential correlations of observations from the same subject.
Model M1 included urban, income, and their interactions. Model M2 included vari-
ables that were significant in Table 3. Tables 5 and 6 report the estimation results of
the random coefficient model. The main effects are similar to the regression models.
Appendix B: Including choices with multiple switching points
This section reports test results with choices exhibiting multiple switching points
included. To infer the matching probability from these choices, I recorded the first
and the last time that choices switch from the ambiguous Lottery B to the risky Lot-
tery A, and considered the subjects to be indifferent between the two lotteries in the
region in between, where they switched multiple times. The middle point of the two
switching points was taken as their matching probability.
Table 7 Ambiguity attitudes: Urban and rural separate
Ambiguity aversion A-insensitivity
Rural Urban Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
income − 0.405 − 0.391∗ − 0.020 − 0.024 − 1.429∗∗∗ − 1.409∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.221) (0.018) (0.017) (0.332) (0.282) (0.014) (0.019)
male 0.068 0.010 0.018 0.001
(0.063) (0.067) (0.090) (0.113)
age − 0.005 − 0.076∗ 0.036 0.130
(0.037) (0.043) (0.041) (0.081)
no.sib − 0.025 − 0.029 0.028 − 0.051
(0.021) (0.039) (0.038) (0.098)
crt − 0.116 − 0.208 − 0.020 0.255
(0.100) (0.138) (0.118) (0.223)
grade 0.001 0.0002 0.001 0.022∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009)
fav.lan 0.007 − 0.005 0.203∗∗∗ − 0.043
(0.065) (0.071) (0.079) (0.123)
rank 0.004 0.002 0.019∗ 0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010)
Constant 0.046 0.156 0.003 1.374 0.771∗∗∗ − 0.152 0.360∗∗∗ − 3.484∗∗
(0.038) (0.727) (0.042) (0.877) (0.051) (0.847) (0.068) (1.677)
Observations 461 443 377 371 461 443 377 371
R2 0.016 0.032 0.008 0.049 0.058 0.095 0.007 0.056
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 8 Urban and rural pooled with interaction terms
Dependent variable:
Ambiguity aversion A-insensitivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
urban − 0.042 1.217 − 0.411∗∗∗ − 3.332∗
(0.057) (1.139) (0.085) (1.879)
income − 0.405 − 0.391∗ − 1.429∗∗∗ − 1.409∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.221) (0.332) (0.282)
male 0.068 0.018
(0.063) (0.090)
age − 0.005 0.036
(0.037) (0.041)
no.sib − 0.025 0.028
(0.021) (0.038)
crt − 0.116 − 0.020
(0.100) (0.118)
grade 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
fav.lan 0.007 0.203∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.079)
rank 0.004 0.019∗
(0.005) (0.011)
urban:income 0.385 0.367∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 1.478∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.221) (0.332) (0.283)
urban:male − 0.058 − 0.017
(0.092) (0.145)
urban:age − 0.071 0.094
(0.057) (0.091)
urban:no.sib − 0.005 − 0.079
(0.044) (0.105)
urban:crt − 0.092 0.275
(0.170) (0.252)
urban:grade − 0.0004 0.021∗∗
(0.006) (0.010)
urban:fav.lan − 0.012 − 0.246∗
(0.096) (0.146)
urban:rank − 0.002 − 0.008
(0.007) (0.015)
Constant 0.046 0.156 0.771∗∗∗ − 0.152
(0.038) (0.727) (0.051) (0.847)
Observations 838 814 838 814
R2 0.014 0.045 0.073 0.113
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 7 presents the regression results for rural and urban separately on the data
including multiple switching points. Similarly, Table 8 presents the regression results
of the pooled regression with interaction terms on this data. Results are similar.
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